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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff/Appellee,

)

vs.

)

SHAWN R. KEITH,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
KEITH

)

Criminal Case No. 025501031

)

Appellant Case No. 20040328-CA

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter in that it is an appeal
in a criminal case not involving a first degree or capital felony, Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for appeal in this case by Appellant are as follows:
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether or not trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion
to suppress after finding that the State of Utah had not complied with the
requirements of Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-44.3 (Utah 1953, as amended)
and Rule 714-500-6 of the Utah Administrative Code?
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that the issue of
testimony of an uncertified officer regarding generation of the intoxilizer 5000 could
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still be admissible under the Rules of Evidence with proper foundation excluding the
requirement for operator certification.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is believed to be one of "correctness" as it applies to
questions of law and the interpretation of statute and a standard of "clearly
erroneous" as it applies to questions of fact. See State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774
and State v. Rhoades. 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v. Gibbons.
770 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989); and State v. Gerard. 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978).
The trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence in its
determination which typically will only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of
discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably. See State v.
Comer, 2002 UT App. 219, f l 1 , 51 P.3d 55 (quoting State v. Whittle. 1999 UT 96,
P 0 , 989 P.2d 52), cert, denied. 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). Whether testimony is
admitted in violation of a defendant's right to confrontation is a question of law that
is reviewed for correctness, see State v. Calliham, 2002 UT. 87,1J31, 57 P.3d 222.
Ordinarily, if a case involves a mixed question of fact and law, the Court affords
some measure of discretion to the district court's application of the law. The
measure of discretion afforded varies, however, according to the issue being
reviewed. See State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125,1J26, 63 P.3d 650. Little discretion
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is afforded to the district court involving issues, such as the reasonableness of
search and seizure, where there must be statewide standards that guide law
enforcement and prosecutorial officials, see State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,1J12, 78
P.3d 590 (quoting Hansen 2002 UT. 25 at 1J26). Where issues on appeal present
questions of statutory interpretation, the proper interpretation of the statute is a
question of law and reviewed for correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999
UT 36 fl17,977 P.2d 1201. The Court of Appeals accords no difference to the legal
conclusions of the trial court but reviews them for correctness. State v. Clark, 2001
UT 9, P , 20 P.3d 300.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Appellant is aware of no statutory provision that is dispositive but believes
the following apply:
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-44.3 (Utah 1953, as amended)
Rule 714-500-6 of the Utah Administrative Code
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE of the CASE: This is a criminal case where the Appellant entered
a plea of "no contest" to the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, a class
A misdemeanor as contained in the information filed with the trial court. On or about
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the 23rd day of June, 2002, Officer Dan Guyman of the Cedar City Police
Department, while on patrol, spotted a white sport utility vehicle or "SUV" that
appeared to be stuck in the area of 700 East 200 South in Cedar City, Iron County,
Utah. Officer Guyman approached the vehicle and found the Appellant with his child.
He noticed the smell of alcohol emanating from the Appellant and administered field
sobriety tests. He then arrested the Appellant and asked him to submit to a breath
test. Appellant registered a .157 on the Intoxilizer 5000. At the time of the test,
Officer Guyman was not certified as an operator although he had testified at the
administrative hearing for driver's license suspension that he was certified.
B. COURSE of PROCEEDINGS and DISPOSITION: In September, 2002, the
Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence and without evidentiary hearing but
upon stipulated facts1, the matter was argued by counsel in January, 2003, before
the Honorable J. Philip Eves. Judge Eves entered his written ruling on or about the
31st day of January, 2003. The Appellant challenged the admissibility of the test
results of the Intoxilizer 5000 where the operator was not certified pursuant to the
Utah Administrative Code R714-500-6. The trial court denied the motion to suppress
finding that the State should be given the opportunity to establish the foundation for

1

The parties stipulated to the facts as was made clear at the State's hearing on
the 13 of January, 2003; see the hearing transcript of that day at page 3; see also the
record at pages 53, 66 and 167.
th
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admission of the breath alcohol test results under Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence,
stating that the same does not require that an expert be certified or licensed prior to
being allowed to testify, certification or the lack thereof going to the weight of such
evidence and not to its admissibility. In March, 2003, after an evidentiary hearing
the trial court determined that the test results were admissible upon the showing that
the Intoxilizer 5000 was operating properly. See the hearing transcript of March 10th,
2003, at pages 62-64; see also the Record at page 168.
In November, 2003, the Appellant entered a "no contest" plea and was
sentenced on the 5th day of January, 2004. The judgment, sentence, stay of
execution of sentence, order of probation and commitment was filed with the Court
on or about the 21st day of January, 2004. The Appellant filed his notice of appeal
on or about the 22nd of January, 2004.
STATEMENT of FACTS
1. On or about the 23rd day of June, 2002, Officer Dan Guyman, of the Cedar
City Police Department was on patrol when he spotted a white SUV that appeared
to be stuck in the area of 700 East 200 South, Cedar City, Iron County, Utah. See
the Record at pages 53,66 and 167; see also the hearing transcript of January 23rd,
2003, at page 3.
2. Officer Guyman approached the vehicle and encountered the Appellant and
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his child. Officer Guyman noticed the smell of alcohol emanating from Appellant and
administered field sobriety tests. Id.
3. Appellant was arrested and asked to submit to a breath test. Appellant
registered . 157 on the Intoxilizer 5000. At the time of the test, Officer Guyman was
not certified as an operator. However, the officer did testify untruthfully at the
administrative hearing for driver's license suspension by stating that he was certified.
Id.
4. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the intoxilizer test
results, arguing that Officer Guyman's failure to keep his certification current on the
Intoxilizer 5000 violated the rules and procedures for such tests promulgated by the
Utah Legislature and the Department of Pubic Safety, thereby making the results of
such tests inadmissible at the trial of this case. See the Record at page 21.
5. The State of Utah argued that while the results of the intoxilizer may not be
presumed admissible under the provisions of the Utah Code, the Utah Rules of
Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence and pursuant to those rules, the
results of the test could be admissible if they satisfy the requirements of Rule 702.
See the Record at page 53.
6. On or about the 31st day of January, 2003, the trial court denied the
Appellant's motion to suppress concluding that Section 41-6-44.3, Utah Code
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Annotated (1953, as amended) only provided a method by which the State could
create a presumption of the validity of a chemical test analysis and did not govern
what was required to determine the admissibility of evidence at trial. See the Record
at page 87; See also the hearing transcript of March 10th, 2003, at pages 62-64.
7. On or about the 1 st day of April, 2004, the trial court entered its findings of
fact and conclusions of law ruling in favor of the State of Utah. See the Record at
page 107.
8. A final judgment was entered to the charge of driving under the influence
of alcohol, a class A misdemeanor, on or about the 21 st day of January, 2004, see
the Record at page147, and Appellant's notice of appeal was filed the 23rd day of
January, 2004, see the Record at page 149.
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
The issue involved in the motion to suppress the breath test evidence is
preserved in the Record on Appeal and a ruling made with findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The facts were stipulated although by evidentiary hearing the
testimony received conforms for purposes of the issues on appeal. Mr. Keith later
entered a plea and waived his right to trial pursuant to a written statement and given
the standard oral colloquy for entry of plea under Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. He did not waive his right to appeal. See the Record at page 131.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.
The trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to suppress after finding
that the State had not complied with the requirement of the Utah Code Annotated,
Section 41-6-44.3 (1953, as amended) and Rule 714-500-6 of the Utah
Administrative Code. The certification and recertification process is intended to
provide training and qualification for the proper use of breath testing devices after
a procedure that ensures the evidence admitted and relied upon is trustworthy.
Certification of the operator is an essential component in the regulatory scheme to
maintain the standard of trustworthiness that was contemplated by the
Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety in complying with Rule 714-500-6
of the Utah Administrative Code. An additional purpose may be inferred from the
specific and detailed requirements which project that the intent was to establish
uniform standards and procedures statewide and not vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. The trial court viewed the question of operator certification as one not
required for admissibility of breath test results under Rule 702, Utah Rules of
Evidence but failed to consider the matter in its proper context pari materia or upon
an interpretation consistent with or in harmony with the more specific statutory and
regulatory provisions. The trial court erred in attempting to apply the Utah Court of
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Appeals rationale in State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1998) which applied
to an alternative basis for admissibility to establish that the breath testing machine
was functioning properly through expert testimony but does not speak to the issue
of operator certification. Extending the rationale of Garcia to include operator
certification circumvents the purpose of the Statute and RuJeaatt compromises the
verification process to a point where evidence would no longer be reliable or
trustworthy and exception to certification prone to exploitation.
B.
The trial court erred in finding that testimony of an officer regarding the
operation of the Intoxilizer 5000 could still be admissible under the Rules of
Evidence with proper foundation excluding the requirement of operator certification.
Allowing testimony based on knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to
render an opinion of the breath test results but not requiring certification as required
by the legislative and administrative provisions undermines the essential regulatory
scheme which has been accepted as the proper basis for establishing reliability and
the basis upon which uniform standards and procedures have been established. The
purpose has been one of efficiency, uniformity and consistency.

There is a

substantive due process and equal protection consideration to treat each defendant
subject to testing with breath testing devices to be treated equally statewide and it
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is not in the interest of the Public Safety Commissioner to have inherent deviation
in test results from different standards or procedures from the various jurisdictions
throughout the state. For testing to be reliable, the promulgated regulatory scheme
for establishing reliability for admissibility in court must be strictly followed and
where there is not indication that an intoxilizer test was performed according to the
standards and procedures, the Appellant's motion to suppress should have been
granted where it concerns operator certification and not a matter of the machine
functioning properly as in State v. Garcia, to vitiate the statutory presumption.
ARGUMENTS
A.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS AFTER FINDING THAT THE STATE HAD NOT COMPLIED WITH
THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. SECTION 41-6-44.3
AND RULE 714-500-6 OF THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
The trial court in its ruling of January 31 st , 2003, denied Appellant's motion to
suppress.

However, the trial court also found that the State of Utah had not

complied with the requirements of Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-44.3 (1953,
as amended) and Rule 714-500-6 of the Utah Administrative Code. Utah Code
Annotated, Section 41-6-44.3 (1953, as amended) provides as follows:
41-6-44.3 STANDARDS FOR CHEMICAL BREATH TEST EVIDENCE.
(1) The Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall
Page 11 of
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establish standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical
analysis of a person's breath, including standards of training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a
person was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as
memoranda or records of acts, conditions, or events to prove that the
analysis was made and that the instrument was accurate, according to
standards established in subsection (1), are admissible if:
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the
investigation at or about the time of the act, condition or event; and
(b) the source of information from which made and method and
circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness.
(3). If the judge finds that the standards under section (1) and the
conditions of subsection (2) have been met, there is presumption that
the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the
evidence is unnecessary, (emphasis added).
The Utah Administrative Code at Rule 714-500-6 constitutes part of the
established standards for administration and interpretation of chemical analysis and
provides as follows:
R 714-500-6. Operator Certification
A. All breath alcohol testing operators, hereinafter "operators" must be
certified by the department.
B. All training for initial and renewal certification will be conducted by
a program supervisor and/or technician.
C. Initial Certification
(1) in order to apply for certification as an operator of a breath testing
instrument, an applicant must successfully complete a course of
instruction approved by the department, which must include as a
minimum the following:
a. One hour of instruction on the effects of alcohol in the human body.
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath
testing.
c. On hour of instruction on the D.U.I. Summons and Citations/D.UI.
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Report forms.
d. One and one half hours of instruction on the legal aspects of
chemical testing, driving under the influence, case law and other
alcohol related laws.
e. One and one half hours of laboratory participation performing
simulated tests on the instruments, including demonstrations under the
supervision of a class instructor.
f. One hour for examination and critic of course.
(2) After successful completion of the initial certification course a
certificate will be issued that will be valid for two years.
D. Renewal Certification
(1) the operator is required to renew certification prior to its expiration
date. The minimum requirement for renewal of operator certification
will be:
a. To hours of instruction on the effects of alcohol on the human body.
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath
testing.
c. One hour of instruction on the D.U.I. Summons and Citations/D.U.I.
Report Form and Testimony of Arresting Officer.
d. Two hours of instruction on the legal aspects of chemical testing and
detecting the drinking driver.
e. One hour of examination and critic of course.
f. Or the operator must successfully complete the compact disk
computer program including successful completion of exam. Result of
exams must be forwarded to the program supervisor and a certification
certificate will be issued.
(2) Any operator who allows his certification to expire one year or
longer must retake and successfully complete the initial certification
course as outlined in paragraph C of this section, (emphasis added).
As is evident from the details and specifics of the certification and
recertification process, it was intended that the Commissioner of the Department of
Public Safety initiate and conduct ongoing training significant and substantial to
comply with the basic requirements of Section 44.3. That is, establish without
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question the trustworthiness of the evidence to be relied upon. In addition, it may be
inferred from the specifics of the Rule that it was the intention of the Commissioner
of the Department of Public Safety to establish uniformity in the operations, practices
and procedures for law enforcement and judicial personnel. In other words, as set
forth in subsection three of Section 44.3, the judge or trier of fact may presume that
the test results are valid without further foundation once the requirements are met.
However, the circumstance before this Court is one that calls into question not only
the issues of reliability and trustworthiness but a concern for maintaining uniform
standards as a matter of operation, practice and procedure to insure that the
certification process is not compromised.
The trial court in the instant case has chosen to interpret the Statute and Rule
as one that allows the court to simply strike the presumption raised had the test
results proven to have been valid. It infers that there is presently no proscribed
restriction and that reliability of the evidence may be established under Rule 702,
Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence pertains to testimony of
experts and is verbatim from the Federal Rule and substantially the same as the
former Rule 56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence prior to 1971. It is general and nonspecific and reads as follows:
RULE 702. TESTIMONY OF EXPERTS.
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will aid the trier of
Page 14 of
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fact in understanding the evidence or to determine a fact in issue a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

The trial court in its assessment of the circumstances concluded by stating as
follows:
Section 41-6-44.3, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) only
provides a method by which the State can create a presumption of
validity of a chemical breath test analysis. It does not govern what is
required to determine the admissibility of the evidence. Such breath
test evidence will be allowed into evidence if the State can lay a proper
foundation for the evidence, including evidence that the intoxilizer was
properly functioning at the time of the test and that the officer
possessed proper knowledge to operate the machine, that the officer
correctly administered the test and that the test result is reliable. See
the Record at page 83.
In drawing such conclusion the trial court also stated that the admissibility of
the intoxilizer test result will hinge on the ability of the State to qualify its officer as
an expert witness2. In doing so the trial court presupposed that Rule 702 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence did not require that an expert be certified or licensed prior to being
allowed to testify; certification, or the lack thereof, was determined to be a piece of
evidence to be considered by the Court in deciding whether the State had
established a proper foundation for the admission of the test result. There is no

2

This is the basis upon which the trial court would later establish as reliable for
allowing admissibility of the breath test results. The fact that the officer had testified
untruthfully under oath on a previous occasion does not appear to have been a factor
or given much consideration in this instance.
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question that the trial court in this case was keenly aware of the requirements of
Rule 702. It is even probable to assume that it exercised caution in scrutinizing the
qualifications of the officer and his proper administration of the test. However, the
concern for allowing evidence of this nature to be admitted as an alternative basis
for establishing reliability without an operator's certification through the established
standards for administration calls in question the need for certification in the first
instance.

It challenges the fundamental premise of statutorily requiring the

Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety to establish such standards and
confounds the fundamental primary assumption upon which the Rule was
promulgated, to insure the trustworthiness of the evidence in question.
In State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1998), the Utah Court of Appeal
addressed a similar issue in the context of Rule 714-500-6 of the Utah Administrative
Code.

In that case, the issue was one of calibration of the Intoxilizer 5000

instrument, which is the same instrument used in the instant case. The testing officer
recorded the results of the reference sample tests as "OK", indicating his opinion that
the results were within an acceptable margin of error. However, he did not record
the actual numerical results obtained. The Defendant moved to suppress the results
of the breath test on the basis of due process violations and the State's violation of
Utah Code. The Utah Administrative Code required that the results conducted on
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the Intoxilizer 5000 series be recorded to at least three (3) decimal places.
In that case, this Court found that the officer's improper recording was a
violation of the Rule. This Court concluded in that case that if it was a violation of
the procedures applicable to those referenced test samples, then "it is a violation
that precludes the State from invoking the statutory presumption provided under
Section 41-6-44.3.

However, this conclusion did not require that evidence of

Garcia's test result be excluded altogether despite Garcia's contention. Nothing in
Section 41-6-44.3 precluded admission of other foundational evidence to establish
the accuracy of the instrument at issue or of Garcia's particular test results. Rather,
it merely defined those conditions under which a prosecutor may invoke a rebuttable
presumption that breath test evidence were accurate and reliable.

If these

conditions were not met, the statutory presumption was not available. The statute
reached no further.
The most obvious distinction between State v. Garcia and the present case
is whether the principle established there regarding the admission of other
foundational evidence of the accuracy of the Intoxilizer 5000 should be extended to
include issues of reliability contemplated by the certification process regulating the
operating officer. The Appellant argues that such an extension invites unnecessary
challenge to the certification process itself, directly affecting the operations,
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practices and procedures for law enforcement and judicial personnel. In Garcia, this
Court's reasoning is sound and not subject to exploitation. The error was one of
implementation of data from which one assumes there was corroboration by
evidence of other inducia of reliability that the machine functioned properly and that
the error committed was one of human nature and not the disfunctioning of the
machine itself. However, the fact that additional expert testimony might be needed
to establish such reliability prevented its exploitation as an alternative means of
admitting evidence without following the certification process provided under the
Rule because it would not be cost effective to do so regularly. One of the very
reasons for implementing the Statute and Rule was to avoid the cost of such expert
testimony. Notwithstanding, it sets a different standard for law enforcement and
judicial personnel to allow the establishment of admissibility of evidence by those
not certified to perform the procedure. It is equivalent to allowing as a justifiable
defense to the charge of driving without a license evidence that the driver was
experienced, trained and otherwise qualified to operate a motor vehicle.
The concern is more than an issue of admissibility under Rule 702, it creates
an exception that circumvents the purpose of the Statute and Rule. It is contrary to
the public policy purpose in establishing uniform standards throughout the State.
Unlike the Garcia case, such an extension would be more susceptible to exploitation
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since the more experience and training the officer acquired in the course of
performing his duties, the less of a need he might justifiably feel to comply with the
certification or recertification requirements of the Rule. Unlike Garcia, there is no
financial disincentive to use expert testimony for purposes of admissibility when it
is reasonable to assume that the very officer uncertified would be qualified as an
expert as contemplated by the trial court judge in the instant case.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT TESTIMONY OF AN OFFICER
REGARDING THE OPERATION OF THE INTOXILIZER 5000 COULD STILL BE
ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH PROPER
FOUNDATION EXCLUDING THE REQUIREMENT OF OPERATOR
CERTIFICATION.
The Appellant contends that the circumstances in State v. Garcia. 965 P.2d
508 (Ut. App. 1998), providing for some alternative means for admissibility of
evidence to whether the Intoxilizer 5000 was functioning properly is an entirely
different issue than the one in the instant case. To allow an uncertified operator of
the machine testify as to its results solely upon his ability to qualify under Rule 702,
Utah Rules of Evidence; namely, that because of his knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education is opening a flood gate and places as unessential the
certification process, section 44.3 and R17-500-6 were originally promulgated to
establish uniform standards of administration consistent and reliable from jurisdiction
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to jurisdiction throughout the State. Either the provisions stand for uniformity and
consistency or they serve no legitimate purpose as a means to establish trustworthy
evidentiary procedure and the compelling interest justifying their enactment goes by
the boards. Since the subject is one that often involves substantive due process and
equal protection it is a matter that should be considered in the context of its impact
upon future enforcement of the certification process.
In Fuenning v. Arizona, 680 P.2d 121 (Ariz. 1983), the Arizona Supreme Court
addressed a defendant's claim that the trial court erred in admitting results of the
intoxilizer test over an objection of insufficient foundation due to the Tempe Police
Department's failure to participate in a "quality assurance program" provided by the
Department of Health Services. The Arizona Court found that the Rules promulgated
by the Director and in effect at the time of the arrest were to promote the accuracy
of test results of approved breath taking devices.

Law enforcement agents

conducting blood alcohol tests by means of direct breath testing devices were
required to participate in a quality assurance program approved by the department.
The operator was to utilize written procedures for performing tests and collecting
samples in a determination of blood alcohol content. As in the instance case, the
operator who administered the test in question was qualified but in this case held a
valid permit. However, he had not participated in the quality assurance program or
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made use of a DHS approved checklist. The State relied upon People v. Adams, 59
Cal. App. 3d 559,131 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1976) which adopted a "goes to the weight not
the admissibility" position.
The Arizona Supreme Court, however, saw the matter differently and
determined that the effect of noncompliance required the evidence to not be
admitted. The Arizona Supreme Court went on to state that it believed that both
sections must be read in pari materia. Any other result would mean that a chemical
test could be admissible if it complied with the five (5) minimum standards contained
in Section 28-692.03(a), but did not comply with the regulations which subsection B
of the same statute requiring the Director of DHS. The Court found that possible
result unacceptable. For purposes of the instant case, however, the purpose for
which the Arizona Supreme Court interpreted the legislative goal is significant. The
legislative goal was to establish a chemical standard which would be objective,
uniform and applied on a statewide basis in order to keep intoxicated drivers off the
road. Given the problems mentioned above there could be inherent deviation in test
results if a particular test was performed in each jurisdiction with different standards
and by different procedures for calibration, accuracy and quality controlled checks.
Nothing would defeat the legislative objective more rapidly than to permit the various
jurisdictions in Arizona to "go their own way" secure the knowledge that a test made
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under their particular procedure would be admissible so long as they show the
"accuracy and reliability" of their local methodology, notwithstanding that a different
"accurate and reliable" procedure used in the adjoining town would have produced
a different result in an otherwise identical situation. It is not within the legislative
objective that a person be found guilty if apprehended in one area but innocent in
another based upon varying standards, practices, operations or procedures. See
Fuenninq at 133.
The Arizona Supreme Court concludes by stating that the State failed to
provide proper foundation for the admission for the chemical test and since there
was no admissible evidence with regard to the blood alcohol level the Court should
have granted Defendant's motion for acquittal.
The same standard is presumed to apply in other forms of testing. For
instance, in State v. Clark, 814 P.2d 222 (Wash. App. 1991), the testing was in the
form of a blood alcohol test where in the context of the preservation of the blood
sample, the Washington Court of Appeals noted that before blood alcohol test
results could be admitted into evidence, the State must present prima facia proof
that the test chemicals and the blood samples are free from any adulteration which
could conceivably introduce error to the test results. While the scientific prospects
of preserving such a sample may invoke a whole different range of considerations,
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the standard is still the same. That is, the State must provide a result which is free
from any conceivable error to be reliable. That is not a standard to comply with
substantially but strictly in every case. Otherwise the process is unreliable.
The Appellant believes that this Court has applied the same standard in
Williams v. 6, 740 P.2d 1354 (Ut. App.) where the Utah Court of Appeals addressed
the standard set in Murry City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983) and stated that the
accuracy of the breathalizer test depends on the proper functioning of the machine
and the proper compounding of chemicals in the ampuls. The Court concluded that
in place of the officer's testimony, affidavits may be submitted regarding
maintenance of a specific breathalizer as admissible evidence of the proper
functioning of the machine. However, the Court found the affidavits in question failed
to satisfy the requirements because they did not attest from personal knowledge.
Where there is no indication that the intoxilizer test was performed in accordance
with the standards established by the Commissioner of Public Safety, the arresting
officer's statement that there was "no problem" with the equipment was insufficient.
The Utah Court of Appeals saw fit not to apply the public records exception of the
hearsay Rule, the Utah Rulesof Evidence 803(a) nor the trustworthy exception in
part C of that Rule. This Court noted that the record was void of any evidence that
the intoxilizer was properly tested and performed according to the standards set by
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the Commissioner of Public Safety. In other words, the standard of admissibility was
that set by the Statute and Rule by the Commission of Public Safety and not as what
otherwise might have been admissible under the general rules of evidence.
In addition, from a clearly practical stand point there is concern about the
impact a decision supporting alternative qualification would have upon the
certification process. Because the standard is more general and less specific under
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, it is not unreasonable to assume that any officer
administering an Intoxilizer 5000 test which is not certified would likely be qualified
as an expert be reason of

his training, experience and knowledge.

If law

enforcement is allowed to proceed on that basis, it is not unreasonable to assume
it will no longer be perceived necessary to continue recertifying. If there was a
situation in where the exception swallowed the rule, this is certainly one thatfitsthe
description.
In Kansas, the Supreme Court in State v. Bishop, 957 P.2d 369 (Kansas 1998)
saw the need for certification as fundamental to its similar statutory scheme. In
pertinent part it states:
To create an evidentiary foundation for a breath test, the State must
introduce evidence into trial that the testing equipment was certified by
the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE), that the
testing procedures were used in accordance with the manufacturer's
operational manual and the requirements set out by the KDHE, and that
the person who operated the testing equipment was certified by the
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KDHE to operate such equipment, (emphasis added).
The Kansas Supreme Court went on to state that the legislature had expressly found
that, for breath test results to be reliable, the testing equipment, the testing
procedures, and the operator of the equipment must all be certified. Id. at 375. In
that case, the court found the evidence to be reliable where the testing procedures
were certified but not with the original certification documentation as photostatic
copies had been reproduced and admitted into evidence in all proceedings, see also
Harry v. Schwendiman, 70 P.2d 1344 (Ut. App. 1987). The Appellant contends that
it makes good sense to allow for alternative methods for validating reliable test
results regarding the operation and function of the testing machine, the Intoxilizer
5000, but the considerations for operator certification are much more significant from
a public policy standpoint disallowing such a practice.

Therefore, it is the

Defendant's position that the trial court's application of the reasoning in Garcia was
misapplied and in error in this case.
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CONCLUSION
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, the Appellant requests
judgment in his favor as the Court deems appropriate together with such and further
relief as to this Court appears equitable and proper.
DATED t h i s / 7

day of

/[/i/UJ

, 20,

J. BRYAN JACKSON,
Attorney for Appellant Keith
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